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A Communitarian Justiication for Measures to Prevent Terrorism in the UK
by Ian Turner
Abstract
he threat to the UK and its Western allies from Al-Qaeda related terrorism has declined but groups such as 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have illed the ‘void’. In response the UK has introduced a rat of 
measures to increase its security, fulilling many of its international and regional responsibilities to prevent 
terrorism. Human rights law is particularly important in this regard as it imposes obligations on states such 
as the UK to prevent violations of rights, such as the right to life, by non-state actors such as terrorists. his 
article seeks to employ a theoretical justiication for a reading of this approach to human rights and focuses on 
legislative measures the UK has introduced to protect them. he philosophy for doing so is communitarianism, 
notably its critique of liberalism, and the post 9/11 revisions to it by communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni in 
particular.
Keywords: Preventing terrorism, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), human rights, 
communitarianism, Amitai Etzioni
Introduction
Terrorism is a crime in international law [1] (though there is little common agreement amongst UN 
member states as to its precise meaning[2]). Yet countries must not leave it to the international community 
and its courts to prosecute its terrorist perpetrators: they themselves have a primary duty to prevent 
terrorism by pursuing suspected terrorists and bringing them to justice in their national courts. Following 
the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks on the United States, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1373 (2001). his obliged states to criminalise terrorism through their domestic laws, including 
deining appropriate punishments. his resolution also called on states to work together urgently to prevent 
and suppress terrorist attacks, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the 
relevant conventions relating to terrorism. In subsequent years the UN Security Council has gone further 
in its attempts to prevent terrorism. Resolution 1624 (2005), for example, extended the duty of states to 
prosecute alleged terrorists in their domestic courts by obliging them to include legislation to prevent 
incitement to commit terrorist acts within their criminal codes. More recently Resolution 2178 (2014) has 
sought to impose further obligations on states. It seeks to deter foreign terrorist ighters from transiting 
countries’ borders, identifying the particular problem of individuals travelling across countries such as 
Turkey to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Many of the principles identiied by the UN 
to prevent terrorism are contained in its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006 which was unanimously 
adopted by the General Assembly.
Preventing terrorism has not been the preserve of the international community. At regional levels, there is 
the Organisation of American States Convention (1986); the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
(1998); and the Organisation for African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
(1999). Within Europe there is the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005). 
Article 5, for example, mirrors UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), in that it calls on states to 
criminalise ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist ofence’. Articles 6 and 7 are also relevant to the 
prevention of terrorism, in that they outlaw terrorist recruitment and training respectively. And following 
the UN’s concern about individuals travelling to join Islamist groups abroad, as per UN Security Council 
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Resolution 2178 (2014), the Council of Europe, too, has sought to address this problem with its Additional 
Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2015). he European Union 
(EU) also calls on its member states to take a series of anti-terrorism measures: it has its own Counter 
Terrorism Strategy (2005), and an Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, (2005).
Human rights law is relevant to the prevention of terrorism, too, in that individuals have rights, including 
the right to life. At the international level there is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Both documents contain references to 
the right to life: Article 3 in the UDHR and Articles 6 in the ICCPR. Regionally, this right is, inter alia, 
protected in the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In reference to 
the latter, Article 2(1) of the ECHR is particularly signiicant in this regard as it imposes a ‘positive’ or 
‘substantive’ obligation on states to protect life.
Traditionally, human rights act ‘negatively’ (or ‘vertically’): they are individual ‘freedoms from’ the state, 
such as ‘freedom from’ torture. Historically, these relect liberal concerns that the government can pose 
a threat to the freedoms of the individual. But rights, especially fundamental ones such as the right to 
life, also act ‘positively’ (or ‘horizontally’). States must take measures to prevent their violations by third 
parties: see the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Osman v. United Kingdom,[3] 
for example. his duty is not absolute but states cannot turn a blind eye to concrete threats of harm to 
individuals by non-state actors such as terrorists. hus, in clearly deined circumstances, human rights law 
will be engaged where a state has failed to prevent a person from being killed as a result of a terror attack. 
here are therefore clear obligations imposed on counties such as the UK to prevent terrorism, whether it 
be international or regional law, of which human rights is a signiicant part.
Following 9/11, the UK has been at a signiicant threat from Islamist terrorism: the ‘Ricin case’, a plot to 
spread the deadly poison ricin on British streets, in 2003; the ‘7/7’ suicide attacks on the London transport 
network, as well as four failed suicide bombings two weeks later, in 2005; the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’, a plot to 
blow up planes lying from London to America with home-made liquids, in 2006 (ten men were convicted 
of crimes relating to this between 2008 and 2010); car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007; a 
failed suicide bombing in Exeter in 2008; the discovery of an explosive device on a cargo plane at East 
Midlands airport in 2010; the convictions of eight men conspiring to detonate suicide vests across various 
parts of the UK, including the London Stock Exchange, Big Ben and Westminster Abbey, in 2012; and 
the bludgeoning to death of an army soldier, Lee Rigby, in a London street in 2013. In recent years there 
has been the spectacular rise of ISIL, targeting primarily close allies of the UK: its shootings at the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014; the oices of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in Paris, 
France, in January 2015; and a café and a synagogue in Copenhagen, Denmark, in February 2015. Lately, 
ISIL committed a massacre in Paris, primarily at the Bataclan heatre, where 89 people were killed, in 
November 2015, detonated two bombs in Brussels in March 2016 and murdered an 85-year-old Catholic 
priest in Normandy, France, in July 2016. And at the time of writing this article there has been an Islamist 
atrocity in the Southern French city of Nice where 84 people were killed by a man deliberately running 
them over in a truck. Following the attacks in Nice, Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Chief Constable of the 
Metropolitan Police Service, Britain’s most senior police oicer, said that a similar terror attack in the UK 
was a matter of ‘when, not if ’.[4] here seems to be no lessening, therefore, in the dangers facing the UK 
and its allies. Noting this, and the clear international and regional obligations imposed on states to prevent 
terrorism, this article seeks to support recent British counter-terror measures by providing a theoretical 
justiication based on communitarianism, especially its critique of liberalism. As the author is UK based, 
naturally, he examines his own state’s domestic anti-terror laws. But the communitarian approach adopted 
here is signiicantly inluenced by American human rights discourse, and is suiciently wide to provide a 
defence of other countries’ counter-terrorism provisions. hus, this line of argumentation should also be of 
interest to other countries.
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he Prevention of Terrorism in the United Kingdom
In the prevention of terrorism, of particular concern to states such as the UK is what to do with those 
that are strongly suspected of engagement in terrorism in the absence of suicient evidence to satisfy 
the criminal standard of proof. Without such a level of evidence suspects who are foreigners cannot 
be deported. In the case of the UK, ordinarily, the government would deport foreign nationals to their 
countries of origin if there is a suspicion that the individuals’ presence in the country was ‘not conducive 
to the public good’, as per section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971. But in the interpretation of Article 2 
of the ECHR, the right to life, and the later Protocol 13, the abolition of the death penalty, the ECtHR has 
ruled that authorities cannot a deport a person to a country where there is a ‘real risk’ that the death penalty 
will be executed: see, for example, Al Sadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom.[5] In many countries in the world 
there is every chance that such a punishment will be imposed on individuals whom the UK suspects have 
been engaged in terrorism. Of course states like the UK are not going to permit individuals who cannot 
be deported unfettered freedom to plot terror attacks in their countries. here will, therefore, be many 
strategies in place to disrupt them. his section examines the measures adopted by the UK. Ultimately, 
the author wishes to justify these measures on communitarian grounds. But in the short term, to provide 
this piece with more balance, he will emphasise the efects these provisions have or have had on the 
human rights of the suspects involved, since a communitarian perspective draws the balance between the 
competing interests of the state and the individual much more in favour of the former rather than the latter.
1. he Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
A few weeks ater the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Britain passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (ATCSA). his introduced the indeinite detention of international terrorist suspects. 
As per section 21(1), the test for detention was satisied if the Home Secretary reasonably believed that the 
terrorist suspect’s presence in the UK was a risk to national security, and s/he suspected that the detained 
person was a terrorist. Regarding the human rights of the detainees, irstly, there were concerns raised 
about unlawful deprivations of liberty in contravention of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.[6] he standard 
of proof for imposing detention was very low—‘reasonable suspicion’, which is the standard of proof 
required to merely arrest a person, as per Article 5(1)(a)—and the length of detention was indeinite. And 
the provisions only applied to ‘international’ suspects, not those who had been born in Britain, so were 
maybe in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, the prohibition on the discrimination of Convention rights. 
Moreover, detaining a person indeinitely, merely on the basis of a suspicion, possibly contravened Article 3 
of the ECHR, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. his was 
arguably so since many of the detainees were said to have sufered from depression and suicidal thoughts. 
Indeed, ‘detainee G’ was granted bail ater England’s Court of Appeal accepted that his detention had 
triggered ‘psychotic episodes: G v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[7] 
he UK government was particularly concerned about the liberty issue of indeinite detention, so to 
make the measures more human rights compliant, it derogated from Article 5(1) of the ECHR, by virtue 
of Article 15(1) of the ECHR, ‘derogation in time of emergency’. he legality of the derogation issue was 
considered by the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court), in 2004 in A. v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department.[8] he House of Lords found that the threat to the UK from international 
terrorism post 9/11 had been a public emergency threatening the life of the nation for the purposes of 
Article 15(1). But the state’s detention provisions were not proportionate to this public emergency, as 
they were not ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. Lord Hofman, for example, said: ‘he 
real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws 
and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’[9] he court also ruled that 
the measures were a disproportionate interference with Article 14 of the ECHR, in that detention applied 
only to foreign suspects (this not being the subject of an original derogation by the UK government under 
Article 15(1)). 
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2. he Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
Following the ruling of the House of Lords in the case of A., the UK government replaced the ofending 
provisions of ATCSA with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). his introduced ‘control orders’ 
for all terror suspects whether they were British or foreign. According to section 1(1) of the PTA a ‘control 
order’ was an order against an individual that imposed obligations on them for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism. A control order made by the Secretary of State 
was called a ‘non-derogating’ control order, as per section 2(3). It was valid for a period of 12 months, but 
could have been renewed on one or more occasions (section 2(4)). Section 1(4) of the PTA stated what 
these obligations might be: for example, electronic tagging, curfews, restrictions on visitors and meeting 
others, a ban on the use of the Internet and limits on phone communication. he British Home Oice 
stated that conditions imposed under a control order were tailored to each case to ensure that a person 
could not take part in terrorist activity.[10] 
Compared to the previous prevention regime under ATSCA, control orders were clearly a relaxation of 
the state’s power over terror suspects: individuals were no longer being detained in prison, indeinitely—
they were free to live at home. But orders were arguably still signiicantly intrusive of the human rights 
of suspects, such as the liberty of the subject. he low standard of proof required for indeinite detention 
under the previous measures—‘reasonable suspicion’—was retained (section 2(1)). And, although the 
legislation imposed a maximum period of 12 months for an order, since it could be renewed, there was 
a sense that it was indeinite. he British Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 
also believed that the combination of obligations imposed on a suspect could themselves constitute an 
unlawful deprivation of liberty.[11] he House of Lords seemingly agreed in a couple of cases: see, for 
example, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ.[12] Here the suspect was subject to the following 
conditions: residency at a one bedroom lat, away from his normal home, for 18 hours per day (16:00 to 
10:00); electronic tagging; compulsory attendance at a police station twice a day; visitors to have been 
approved by the Home Oice; limited use of the telephone; and a ban on the use of the Internet.
he JCHR was also concerned about possible violations of Article 8(1) of the ECHR, the right to private 
and family life. It believed that control orders were unjustiiably interfering with the human rights of 
members of a controlee’s family.13 Of particular concern was the condition requiring some controlees to 
move away from their normal place of residence, ‘relocation’, oten far away from their family and friends.14 
Like the ATCSA provisions before them, there were also concerns that control orders might contravene 
Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. 
In 2006 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) reported on its indings following a 
visit to the UK during 2005. It was able to interview some individuals subject to control orders. In reference 
to one individual, P, the CPT stated that he was severely depressed and anxious, in considerable distress and 
despair, with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. It noted that the depression could not be treated 
as long as the control order restrictions remained in place. So the risk of self-harm and even suicide was 
signiicant.[15] 
Other organisations with a particular interest in human rights, such as Amnesty International, were 
concerned about a lack of procedural rights for suspects subject to a control order. Controlees were being 
accused by the authorities of involvement in terrorism-related activity. But, as they had not been charged 
with an ofence, they were not entitled to many of the safeguards accorded to those suspected of a crime, 
such as a right to see the evidence against them, as per Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR.[16] he legality 
of this issue was considered by the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB, 
AF,[17] where the court found that control orders were in fact civil orders, not criminal ones. hus, the 
protections aforded to those accused of a crime in Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR did not apply to 
suspects.[18]
Upon coming to power in July 2010, the then coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats announced a review of the previous Labour administration’s many counter-terrorism measures, 
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one of which was the control order scheme.[19] It said that over the past decade the British state had 
become ‘too authoritarian’ and the review was ‘an important irst step in meeting our commitment to...
creating a counter-terrorism regime that is proportionate, focussed and transparent, striking the right 
balance between security and civil liberties.’[20] he Government’s review was published in 2011 and 
recommended the abolition of control orders.[21]
3. he Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011
he Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 abolished control orders and replaced 
them with terrorism prevention and investigation measures (‘TPIMs’). Persons afected were permitted 
a home phone and a mobile one, together with a computer with Internet access. Instead of curfews there 
was an overnight residence requirement; and ‘relocation’ to another part of the country without a person’s 
consent was not permitted. Signiicantly, the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM was higher 
than that previously for a control order: ‘reasonable belief ’ as opposed to ‘reasonable suspicion’. TPIMs were 
time limited to two years, and could only be re-imposed ater that period where there was a reasonable 
belief that the individual had been engaged in terrorist activity during the currency of the order. So with 
TPIMs there was an attempt to redress, again, the balance in favour of the individual. A relaxation of 
the obligations imposed on suspects were, collectively, less likely to infringe Article 5(1) of the ECHR, 
as was the raising of the standard of proof. And the abolition of ‘relocation’ without consent went some 
considerable way in fulilling the state’s duty to respect a person’s right to private and family life, as per 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR. In addition, because of the greater liberties granted to suspects, those subject to 
a TPIM were less likely to sufer a mental disorder such as depression, so the risks of a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR decreased signiicantly, too. But in relaxing the freedoms of individuals still further, the state 
seemingly failed to exercise proper control over some of the suspects. his was especially so ater several 
high proile cases of people absconding, such as Ibrahim Magag in December 2012,[22] and Mohammed 
Ahmed Mohamed in November 2013; the latter famously escaped by dressing in a burka and disappearing 
during a visit to a mosque.[23] 
Moreover, it will also be recalled that TPIMs could only be imposed for a maximum of two years, unless a 
person had engaged in terrorism during the currency of the order. he TPIMS legislation came into efect 
in January 2012 so concern was raised about what the state would do from January 2014 onwards when 
the irst TPIMs would cease. For example, Diana Johnson, then Shadow Crime and Security Minister, said 
at the time: ‘hese are suspects that only this year the Home Secretary was arguing were too dangerous to 
be let uncontrolled and that was agreed to by judges. We need an urgent independent threat assessment 
of whether TPIMs on any of the January suspects needs to be extended.’[24] Indeed, at a similar time, a 
former independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation in the UK, Lord Carlile QC, had called for the 
reintroduction of control orders, to increase security. Carlile was particularly anxious about the threat to 
the UK from Britons returning to the country ater having travelled abroad to join ISIL.[25]
In March 2014 David Anderson QC, the UK’s current Independent Reviewer on Anti-Terror Legislation, 
published an annual report of the operation of the TPIM scheme in 2013. He said that there were (at 
the time of writing his report) 10 TPIM subjects, of whom nine had been transferred from control 
orders in early 2012. All were men believed to have been involved in al-Qaida related terrorism, some 
at the highest end of seriousness (the planning of credible mass casualty attacks).[26] To this end, 
Anderson recommended that the power to impose TPIMs should continue, but like any measure short of 
imprisonment, they would never provide a full guarantee of safety. But properly deployed ‘as a last resort’, 
they were a ‘useful means of disrupting potentially dangerous terrorists for up to two years’.[27] But this 
was not without some suggestions for reform. Anderson said that some signiicant changes were needed if 
TPIMs ‘were to remain fully credible’, and if they were to perform ‘more than just a containing function’. 
First, locational constraints on some TPIM subjects should be stronger than had been the case, ‘in order 
more efectively to disrupt networks and deter or prevent absconds’;[28] secondly, the standard of proof for 
involvement in terror activity should be raised from ‘reasonable belief ’ to the civil standard, a ‘balance of 
probabilities’.[29]
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4. he Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
Following calls for the reintroduction of control orders, or at least a signiicant reform of TPIMS, the then 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced new statutory measures in 2014. hese included temporarily 
stopping suspects from travelling abroad by seizing passports and temporarily preventing individuals from 
returning to the UK. hese provisions are now contained in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
Section 1 refers to the seizure of passports etc. from persons suspected of involvement in terrorism and 
section 2 imposes temporary exclusion orders from entering the UK. In particular, the government also 
reformed TPIMs, which is Part 2 of the statute. Section 16 amends the TPIMS Act, allowing for a residence 
speciied by the Secretary of State, including at least 200 miles away from a suspect’s home. he reintroduction 
of ‘relocation’ raises concerns, again, about the subject’s right to private and family life, as per Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR. hat said, section 20 of the legislation amends the standard of proof for the imposition of a TPIM, 
in raising it from ‘reasonable belief ’ to a ‘balance of probabilities’. From the perspective of the right to liberty 
of a subject, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR, this is a welcome development. he reform of TPIMS in 2015 
represents the UK’s current attempts to prevent acts of terrorism by those it cannot either deport on human 
rights grounds or prosecute because of a lack of evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof.
he Prevention of Terrorism: Balancing Rights and Security
he previous section analysed a rat of measures the UK has employed to disrupt the activities of suspected 
terrorists, particularly since 9/11. It is well recognised, however, that in states’ eforts to prevent terrorism 
there is a corresponding obligation imposed on them to respect human rights: see, for example, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 60/158 he Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, 2005, and Pillar IV of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006. Oten 
a respect for the human rights of the individual is premised on the basis that it prevents terrorism: a 
disregard for fundamental freedoms in fact increases the risk of terrorism, thus making states less safe. In 
reference to the UK’s history of preventing terrorism in Northern Ireland, for example, the UN’s Special 
Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson QC, has said: ‘Human rights-
abusive policies increase the presence of terrorism. You only have to look at the recent past in Northern 
Ireland where internment without trial turned the IRA [Irish Republican Army] from a group with little 
support into a much larger organisation.’[30] Furthermore, a genuine respect for the human rights of the 
individual necessitates limitations on the powers of the state, especially in times of public emergency; the 
views of commentators such as Ronald Dworkin,[31] David Luban,[32] Jeremy Waldron,[33] and Lucia 
Zedner[34] are important in this regard. Waldron, for example, says that whilst reductions in individual 
freedoms may prevent a terror action taking place, they necessarily also increase the power of the state, and 
there is a corresponding risk that these enhanced powers may also be used to cause harm.[35] (Here, one 
may recall Lord Hofman’s cautioning against the UK introducing the indeinite detention of terror suspects 
in the House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.[36]) Waldron also says that the 
state is ‘always looking to limit liberty’, and a terrorist emergency ‘provides a ine opportunity’: he believes 
that people become more than usually deferential to the demands of their rulers in these circumstances 
and more than usually fearful that if they criticize the proposed adjustments they will be reproached for 
being insuiciently patriotic.[37] In addition, he noted that oten those who advocate greater security at the 
expense of liberty have no idea what diference it will actually make to the terrorist threat.[38] Assuming 
that this is indeed the case, he concludes that we should not give up our liberties for the sake of ‘purely 
symbolic gains in the war against terrorism’.[39]
In the various legislative measures the UK has enacted since 2001 it is obvious that the country has 
struggled with the competing claims of human rights and security. he earlier measures such as the 
indeinite detention of terror suspects, as per ATCSA, certainly point to a balance much more in favour 
of the state at the expense of the freedoms of the individual: they were unlawful infringements of the 
right to liberty, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR; and the psychological harm they caused to detainees 
were maybe violations of Article 3 of the ECHR. he repeal of indeinite detention, in the Prevention of 
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Terrorism Act 2005, still caused concern because of the possible efects control orders had on the human 
rights of suspects: an unlawful deprivation of liberty, as per Article 5(1) of the ECHR; a denial of a fair 
trial, as per Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the ECHR; and a disproportionate interference with a controlee’s right 
to family life, as per Article 8(1) of the ECHR, namely ‘relocation’. hese issues afected signiicantly the 
government’s decision to repeal them in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (TPIMS) 
2011, relaxing the controls imposed on a terror suspect still further. Pointedly, the standard of proof for 
the imposition of a TPIM was raised from ‘reasonable suspicion’ to ‘reasonable belief ’, ‘curfews’ were 
replaced with an ‘overnight residency’ and ‘relocation’ was abolished. But with some high proile individuals 
absconding, and the growing terror threat from ISIL, the balance tipped back in favour of the state with the 
reform of TPIMs in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Revised TPIMs are clearly not a return 
to indeinite detention. But the reintroduction of a ‘relocation’ provision suggests a return to the old control 
order scheme in all but name. his further curtailment of the liberty of the individual, in violation of Article 
8(1) of the ECHR, annexing a person from their associates, particularly their family, will in all likelihood 
increase their marginalisation, thus increasing the risk that they will engage or reengage in terrorism.
To perhaps ofset this further intrusion into a person’s liberty, the standard of proof for the imposition of 
a TPIM has been raised to a ‘balance of probabilities’. But TPIMs, like control orders before them, are still 
civil orders, thus the procedural rights accorded to those suspected of a crime, such as Articles 6(2) and 
6(3) of the ECHR, are still denied them. And a combination of controls over a suspect may still amount 
to an unlawful deprivation of liberty, in contravention of Article 5(1) of the ECHR. his is particularly 
problematic if liberty has been denied merely on the basis of the civil law, rather than a conviction 
following a criminal trial—see Article 5(1)(a). It remains an open question, therefore, whether the UK’s 
current balance between the rights of a suspected terrorist and its competing interest of maintaining 
security intrudes too much on the fundamental freedoms of individuals serving a TPIM, in violation of UN 
General Assembly Resolution 60/158 he Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, 2005.
In summary, existing TPIMs still have signiicant implications for the rights of suspects; and, to draw on 
Ben Emmerson QC, the ensuing risks to security which these human rights violations might entail should 
not be overlooked. TPIMs also confer substantial powers on the state that could be used to cause harm, 
as Jeremy Waldron has argued. However, the reforms to TPIMs were welcomed by David Anderson QC 
in 2015, in his annual report of the operation of the TPIM scheme in 2014.[40] hus, notwithstanding the 
obvious consequences outlined here, there is arguably still a case to be made for supporting them. his is 
the aim of the next section of this piece.
A Communitarian Justiication for TPIMs
According to the Global Terrorism Index, 2015, 32,658 people were killed by terrorism in 2014 compared 
to 18,111 in 2013: the largest ever increase recorded. Countries sufering over 500 deaths increased by 
120% to 11 countries. 78% of all deaths and 57% of all attacks occurred in just ive countries: Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria.[41] Excluding the 9/11 attacks, only 0.5% of deaths from terrorism have 
occurred in the West since 2000.[42] Globally, therefore, the UK and its allies are relatively safe compared 
to other countries. hat said, this is not to ignore the continuous attacks by Islamist terrorists such as ISIL 
in Western Europe: Brussels in 2014; Paris in January 2015; Brussels again in January 2015; Copenhagen in 
February 2015; Paris again in November 2015; and Nice in July 2016. It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, 
that senior police oicers across Europe now claim that the continent faces its highest terror threat since 
9/11.[43] Domestically, because of the signiicant risk posed to the UK by Islamist groups such as ISIL, 
the British government increased its national terrorism threat level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’, meaning 
an attack was ‘highly likely’, in 2014.44 he UK threat level from international terrorism is still at ‘severe’ 
some two years later. Indeed, discussing this level of threat to the UK, Andrew Parker, the Director-General 
of Britain’s Security Service (‘MI5’), noted: ‘We face a very serious threat that is complex to combat and 
unlikely to abate signiicantly for some time.’[45] Evidentially, therefore, a continuation of measures to 
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prevent terrorism in the UK such as TPIMS, as well as newer approaches to stop individuals leaving the 
country to join ISIL, such as the seizure of passports, is required. Here the author seeks to justify the 
imposition of these measures to prevent terrorism on theoretical grounds, namely ‘communitarianism’. But 
as ‘communitarianism’ grew out of a criticism of liberalism, notably the approaches articulated by John 
Rawls in A heory of Justice, it is necessary to begin with a brief discussion of liberalism to understand fully 
the communitarian approach. 
Historically, liberalism is associated with philosophers such as John Locke and his ‘social contract’ theory. 
Locke’s principal work was the Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689. In the Second Treatise 
Locke argued that individuals covenanted with the state for reasons of security. But Locke was hostile to 
too much liberty being sacriiced in this bargain of protection, in that this, too, compromised the security 
of the individual.[46] Locke therefore advocated a minimal state whose power was limited to the public 
good of society and its preservation, and could not be used ‘to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish 
the subjects.’[47] hus, Locke believed individuals possessed ‘natural rights’ against the sovereign such 
as ‘life, liberty, and estate [property]’, which could not be removed without their consent.[48] Of these 
property was the most important, the protection of which was the chief reason for instituting government.
[49] In comparison to Locke, a more moderate—and modern—approach to liberalism is epitomised 
in the writings of another John, John Rawls. Liberalism, for Rawls, was also very much concerned with 
individual autonomy; people should be free to live their lives, to choose and pursue values for themselves, 
so the state should remain neutral, or at least act only in an advisory capacity, on issues such as these.[50] 
hus, in terms of freedom of expression, for example, censorship by the state imposes the state’s values on 
individuals, thus compromising a person’s freedom to choose. 
In A heory of Justice Rawls founded a conception of justice on, perhaps unsurprisingly, respect for the 
individual. Rawls arrived at his notion of justice by considering what individuals in the ‘original position’ 
would choose as principles of justice for the basic structure of society. hey would decide behind a ‘veil 
of ignorance’, which prevented them from knowing their place in society, their class position or social 
status, their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence and their strength. 
his ensured that no one was advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles.[51] Because of the 
uncertainty of the ‘veil’ process, Rawls believed two principles of justice would be chosen in the ‘original 
position’. he irst of these, the ‘liberty principle’, which had priority over the second, was—‘each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’.
[52] hat is, each person would have the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the same amount 
of liberty for everyone else, which even the general welfare could not override. hese ‘basic liberties’ are 
political freedoms, such as speech, assembly and conscience, freedom from arbitrary arrest and freedom of 
personal property.[53] Rawls’s second principle of justice, which is perhaps less important to this article, was 
divided into two: ‘fair equality of opportunity’ and the ‘diference principle’. he former, which prevailed 
over the latter, suggests that individuals with the same talents and willingness to use them had the same 
educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor.[54] he latter, 
‘the diference principle’, is concerned with the distribution of social and economic advantages,[55] that is, 
goods, wealth and authority to the least advantaged of society.[56]
In this article, the author is justifying recent anti-terror measures in the UK, such as TPIMS, on the basis 
of communitarianism. TPIMs are anti-liberty—or at least signiicantly intrusive of liberty—so logically are 
not conducive to liberalist ideas about the individual and the state, such as Rawls’s ‘liberty principle’; and 
certainly not compatible with liberalism’s traditional Lockean ideals of ‘natural rights’. his then introduces 
communitarianism’s critique of liberalism as a natural theoretical basis for the UK’s counter-terror 
measures. Modern-day communitarianism, such as that proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre,[57] Michael J 
Sandel,[58] Charles Taylor[59] and Michael Walzer,[60] began in the form of a critical reaction to A heory 
of Justice. Sandel states, for example:
‘At issue is…whether the principles of justice that govern the basic structure of society can be 
neutral with respect to the competing moral and religious convictions its citizens espouse…
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One way of linking justice with the conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice derive 
their moral force from values commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular community or 
tradition. his way of linking justice and the good is communitarian in the sense that the values of 
the community deine what counts as just or unjust.’[61]
hus, the main theme of communitarianism is that there are common formulations of the public good 
rather than leaving it to be determined by each individual; the state cannot remain neutral on the issue. 
And in further rejecting Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical exercise, communitarians do not believe 
that individuals are born free and unencumbered, wholly autonomous agents:[62] they are ‘bundles 
of particularistic attributes’.[63] We are bearers of a particular social identity; we are someone’s son or 
daughter, someone’s cousin or uncle; we are citizens of this or that city, members of this or that guild or 
profession; we belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. We inherit from the past of our family, our city, 
our tribe, our nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. hese constitute 
the given of our lives, our starting point.[64]
More recent theories of communitarianism are those advanced by Amitai Etzioni[65] and Mary Ann 
Glendon.[66] In attacking liberalism’s seemingly unhealthy emphasis on the individual, Etzioni claims 
that communitarians seek to rebuild community: there needs to be a strengthening of the bonds that tie 
people to one another, enabling them to overcome the isolation and alienation of liberalism.[67] Indeed, 
Etzioni notes that communitarianism is relected in the preamble to the Constitution of the United 
States: ‘to form a more perfect Union’.[68] For Etzioni – and Glendon – an important communitarian 
principle is redressing the balance between liberalism’s emphasis on the rights of the individual and social 
responsibilities,[69] believing that no society can survive if people only want rights and are unwilling to 
assume responsibilities.[70] he liberal emphasis on individualism – and neglect of social responsibilities – 
inherits much from Locke, which signiicantly inluenced the tradition of ‘absolute’ human rights in the US. 
Rights Talk: he Impoverishment of Political Discourse by Mary Ann Glendon is especially important in this 
regard: 
‘[American] rights talk, in its absoluteness promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social 
conlict and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation or at least the 
discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone 
acceptance of the beneits of living in a democratic social welfare states, without accepting the 
corresponding personal civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is 
inhospitable to society’s losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependents, 
young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and 
personal virtue.’[71]
Drawing on communitarianism as a theoretical foundation for the justiication of the erosion of rights of 
terror suspects, particularly through the imposition of TPIMs, the author does struggle with this approach, 
however: it is in fact wedded to notions of liberalism, at least according to its modern interpreters. Etzioni, 
for example, is seemingly supportive of traditional liberal concerns about conferring too much power on 
the state. In his vision of communitarianism, Etzioni claims that free individuals require a ‘community 
that protects them from the state’, and sustains morality by drawing on ‘the gentle prodding of kin, friends, 
neighbours, and other community members’.[72] As a source for guiding behaviour, he says that this moral 
encouragement is preferable to government controls or fear of authorities.[73] his obvious scepticism 
about the state is further relected in Etzioni’s seemingly unconditional faith in freedom of speech, as 
relected, for example, in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He dismisses 
suggestions that it should be curbed to bar expressions of racism, sexism, and ‘other slurs’.[74] Elsewhere he 
has discussed other forms of expression such as hate speech and argued that all regulations and codes that 
limit it should be voided.75 his liberal approach to communitarianism has not gone unnoticed by earlier 
exponents of the philosophy, such as Alasdair MacIntyre. In a later edition of Ater Virtue, MacIntyre takes 
speciic issue with Etzioni:
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I see no value in community as such—many types of community are nastily oppressive—and 
the values of community, as understood by the American spokespersons of contemporary 
communitarianism, such as Amitai Etzioni, are compatible with and supportive of the values of the 
liberalism that I reject.[76]
hus, utilising this more contemporary form of communitarianism as a justiication for measures to 
prevent terrorism, particularly in the UK, is going to prove problematic. Indeed, whilst the author is 
concentrating on attempts to disrupt the terrorist activities of individuals, such as TPIMS, other measures 
adopted by the UK to curb terrorism are particularly relevant here as well, especially if we are referring to 
Etzioni’s hostility towards limiting freedom of speech. For example, following Article 5 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005 – ‘public provocation to commit a terror ofence’ 
– the UK has outlawed ‘encouragement of terrorism’, as per section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006; this is 
aimed at verbal support for terrorism. If the support is written, then there is a corresponding ofence of 
‘dissemination of terrorist publications’, as per section 2. Presumably, the communitarianism of Amitai 
Etzioni would view this as an unnecessary violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and 
seek to have it overruled by the Supreme Court (assuming, for the sake of argument, British law was in 
fact under the authority of American Constitutional Law)?[77]his would be especially so as these terrorist 
ofences in the UK are drawn very widely: individuals can be encouraged indirectly, not just directly, to 
commit terrorism; and the perpetrators can be committing the ofences recklessly, not just intentionally.[78]
Why, therefore, is this author seeking to justify a signiicant portion of anti-terror law in the UK on the 
basis of communitarianism, and seemingly its more liberal elements as relected in the writings of Amitai 
Etzioni? First, of the so called communitarians, Etzioni is the person who has written most about security 
post 9/11; and, maybe more importantly, he has seemingly become much less liberal – and much more pro-
state – since the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Liberals in the 
classic sense such as A. C. Grayling have attacked further incursions of individual freedoms for the ‘good’ of 
security as a ‘mistake of crisis proportions’ and an ‘act of self-harm’, claiming they hand ‘the victory to the 
terrorists at no further cost to them’.[79] his is not the language and tone of the ‘new Etzioni’ post 9/11; in 
fact Etzioni takes an opposite view to Grayling. Democracy, Etzioni believes, is threatened when measures 
to protect it are not taken.[80] He proclaims: 
True patriots…realize that one must protect the nation from all enemies and the essence of what it 
means to be patriotic is to protect our Constitution and its Bill of Rights with all our might…Only 
when we have failed to this will have done the terrorists’ job for them.[81]
In a separate piece of writing, Etzioni elaborates on what states must do to protect themselves from 
terrorism. He believes all kinds of terrorists – those who use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), 
suicide bombs, and ‘mere’ fanatics – cannot be efectively deterred by the ordinary criminal justice system, 
suggesting a separate system of justice is required for them.[82] Seemingly sharing this author’s belief in the 
signiicant curtailment of the rights of terrorist suspects for reasons of public protection, Etzioni criticises 
those who urge that suspected terrorists are to be treated like other criminals; assumed innocent until 
proven guilty; tried in ordinary courts according to similar procedures employed in the trying of other 
criminals; aforded several layers of appeals if found guilty; and incarcerated and released once they have 
served their terms. Importantly, he suggests that such an approach accords ‘terrorists more rights than they 
are entitled to, and unduly and signiicantly increases risks to the security of innocent citizens’.[83] Etzioni’s 
explanation for why terrorists cannot be treated as ordinary criminals is that they need to be prevented 
rather than deterred: ‘you cannot punish people who commit suicide ater the fact.’[84]
hat said, Etzioni does express support for limitations to the power of the state, in its attempts to prevent 
terrorism. He believes that liberty and security are both important but neither has a priority. heir relative 
importance changes from time to time and from situation to situation. he safer the nation feels, the 
more weight judges will be willing to give to the liberty interests. he greater the threat that an activity 
poses to the nation’s safety, the stronger will the grounds appear for seeking to repress that activity even 
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at some cost of liberty. He claims that this ‘luid approach’ is only ‘common sense’.[85] With the existing 
terror threat from ISIL in Western Europe—three atrocities committed in France alone between 2015 and 
2016—Etzioni would surely balance the liberty/security divide here much more in favour of the state than 
the individual. But of course as the terrorist threat declines there would be much more emphasis on the 
rights of the suspect. Furthermore, even in the most extreme of cases, Etzioni believes that terrorists should 
‘indisputably be guaranteed some basic rights’. hey should be captured rather than killed. hey should not 
be tortured or turned over to other states that are likely to kill or torture them. And seemingly rejecting 
the UK’s indeinite detention provisions, as per ATCSA, suspects should be subject to a deined period of 
administrative detention, rather than holding them indeinitely, which could be extended through legally 
established channels if necessary.[86] (his approach therefore also excludes counter-terrorism provisions 
in other countries such as America’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, permitting 
indeinite detention.) In saying this, therefore, Etzioni impliedly supports less intrusive prevent measures in 
the UK such as TPIMs, and maybe even control orders before them.
Actions to prevent terrorism, particularly in the UK, can be justiied further on the basis of human rights 
law, that is, the state’s substantive duty to protect life, as per Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which was stated 
above. Indeed, Etzioni is keen to premise his approach to security post 9/11 on the basis of the right to life, 
too, saying that in all declarations and charters enumerating human rights, this freedom trumps all others.
[87] And, from an American perspective, he notes that, signiicantly, life precedes both liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence.[88] 
Conclusion
Since the atrocities in America in 2001 year ater year there have been terror attacks by Islamists. 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria have borne the brunt of these, accounting for 57% of the 
world’s attacks in 2014. But the security of the UK and its Western allies is not to be ignored. he threat to 
these countries from Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan has abated, since its leader, Osama Bin Laden, 
was killed by American special forces in Pakistan in May 2011. In addition, the threat from Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula has declined following the killing of its main gloriier, Anwar al-Awlaki, by an American 
drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. But ISIL appears to have illed this Islamist ‘void’. In recent years, 
France and Belgium, geographically close neighbours of the UK, have been its principal European victims. 
he last signiicant Islamist outrage in the UK was eleven years ago, in 2005. But this is maybe more to do 
with the successes of the police and security forces in foiling terror plots rather than due to a lack of trying 
on the part of the terrorists. he convictions of ten men for the ‘Airline Bomb Plot’ between 2008 and 2010, 
and the convictions of eight men for conspiring to detonate suicide vests across various parts of the UK in 
2012, serve as reminders to this. Indeed, Britain’s senior police oicer, Bernard Hogan-Howe, has warned 
that an attack in the UK, in severity to those recently in France, is only a question of ‘when, not if ’. All in all, 
therefore, the UK should expect further threats to its collective security from Islamists such as ISIL.
States are under an obligation, internationally and regionally, to prevent terrorism. hey fulil this 
duty, inter alia, by prosecuting alleged ofenders. However, there are occasions when governments have 
insuicient evidence to bring a case to trial, though there are strong grounds for suspecting the engagement 
of individuals in acts of terrorism. In these instances, states have introduced a range of measures to disrupt 
the activities of suspects. In so doing, they must also respect their corresponding duty to respect the human 
rights of individuals. Countries that sacriice too much individual freedoms in the furtherance of security 
seriously risk undermining their duties in preventing terrorism, in that they encourage further attacks. In 
the last iteen years or so the UK, for example, has struggled with harmonising its obligations to protect 
its citizens with respect for the human rights of terrorist suspects, particularly following the 9/11 attacks in 
2001. he measures it introduced in ATCSA were unlawful deprivations of liberty, and possibly inhuman 
and degrading treatment. he UK’s latest attempt at striking the right balance between liberty and security 
is the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. his has reintroduced the ‘relocation’ power for TPIMs 
(though this has maybe been ofset with the raising of the standard of proof from ‘reasonable belief ’ to a 
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‘balance of probabilities’). he statute also created new provisions to deter individuals from joining ISIL in 
Syria and Iraq, such as the seizure of passports and the temporary prevention of individuals from returning 
to the UK. 
Human rights law imposes duties on states, in certain circumstances, to prevent death from non-state 
actors such as terror suspects. he author of this article supports recent counter-terror measures in Britain 
ironically on the basis of human rights. Indeed, he aims to go further in ofering a theoretical justiication 
for this reading of human rights: a communitarian critique of liberalism. he communitarianism of 
Alasdair McIntyre, Michael Sandel and others developed as a direct criticism of John Rawls’s A heory of 
Justice, in rejecting Rawls’s ‘neutral’ ‘veil of ignorance’ exercise. hese communitarians also disputed the 
idea that individuals were born as free, wholly autonomous agents. Later communitarians such as Amitai 
Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon sought to position the philosophy within a culture of responsibilities, 
distinguishing it from liberalism’s traditional approach to absolute freedoms, notably in America. hus, as 
a theoretical justiication for the infringement of the rights of terror suspects, communitarianism’s attempt 
to rebalance ‘rights talk’ away from the historical liberal emphasis on respect for the individual to the 
community is suited to the more expansive, ‘collective’ interpretation of human rights articulated here. hat 
said, communitarianism’s early suitors such as Alasdair MacIntyre came to fundamentally disagree with 
its later proponents, such as Amitai Etzioni, viewing them as essentially liberal. his author’s analysis of 
Etzioni’s approach to freedom of speech and the First Amendment of the US Constitution supports this.
Post 9/11, however, Etzioni has clearly adopted a much less liberal approach to his style of 
communitarianism by embracing the obvious realisation that to preserve democracy requires an 
incursion—even a signiicant incursion—into the rights of terrorist suspects. his is the approach to 
communitarianism that the present author locates for his theoretical justiication for measures to prevent 
Islamist terrorism in Britain. Etzioni impliedly rejects the UK’s previous indeinite detention measures, 
as per ATCSA (as well as similar measures in other countries such as America’s National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012), but appears to support a more intrusive framework for the 
UK than TPIMs, or at least prior to the reform of TPIMs in 2015. Whilst this author analyses his own 
country’s domestic anti-terror laws, it is hoped that the communitarian approach he employs here, which is 
signiicantly inluenced by American human rights discourse, is suiciently wide to be attractive to critical 
observers in other countries.
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